Abstract. Next-generation autonomous manufacturing plants create individualized products by automatically deriving manufacturing schedules from design specifications. However, because planning and scheduling are computationally hard, they must typically be done offline using a simplified system model, meaning that online observations and potential component faults cannot be considered. This leads to the problem of plan assessment: Given behavior models and current observations of the plant's (possibly faulty) behavior, what is the probability of a partially executed manufacturing plan succeeding? In this work, we propose 1) a statistical relational behavior model for a class of manufacturing scenarios and 2) a method to derive statistical bounds on plan success probabilities for each product from confidence intervals based on sampled system behaviors. Experimental results are presented for three hypothetical yet realistic manufacturing scenarios.
Introduction
In a scenario of mass customization using autonomous manufacturing, a factory is envisaged that generates, during the night, the manufacturing plans for numerous individualized products to be produced the next day. It employs model-based planning and scheduling capabilities, which use very abstract models to keep planning/scheduling tractable, omitting e.g. behavioral knowledge about potential failures of factory stations. In addition, observations made at execution time are not available at planning/scheduling time. In the light of such partial observations, it may become clear that certain plans will fail, e.g. if a plan operates a component that is now likely to be faulty. This leads to a problem of evaluating manufacturing plans with respect to online observations, based on models focussed on station behavior. It is especially interesting from the point of view of autonomous manufacturing control, where systems are rigid enough to allow automated advance planning/scheduling (rather than online planning), yet bear inherent uncertainties such as station failures.
We call this evaluation plan assessment [1] . The idea is to compute, for each product, bounds on the respective success probability. This allows to decide whether to 1) continue with a plan, 2) stop the plan because it probably will not succeed or 3) gather more information. It requires a) models of the complex, uncertain interactions among products and factory stations and b) efficient reasoning. In [1] we proposed using probabilistic automata models and a solution based on constraint optimization, Preprint submitted to KI 2010. which enumerates the k most probable system behaviors to estimate success probabilities. However, computing bounds is not yet possible with this approach. In this work we choose a different approach, where we a) model entire classes of manufacturing systems as Bayesian Logic Networks (BLNs) [2] and b) use sampling algorithms for efficient computation of statistical bounds on success probabilities based on confidence intervals. The contribution of this paper is 1) to present a BLN model for a class of manufacturing systems, 2) to propose a method to obtain said bounds from ClopperPearson confidence intervals [3] computed during inference and 3) to demonstrate the feasibility of this approach through experimental results.
Closest to our work are verification methods such as probabilistic model checking [4] , online verification [5] , or probabilistic verification [6] . However, [4] don't regard online observations, and [6] deal only with single most likely behaviors, whereas we have to consider many goal-violating (and achieving) behaviors, and all of them usually focus on models of single systems such as cars [5] . In contrast, we model a manufacturing facility and the products it processes. Other work addressed automated manufacturability analysis. They ask whether machining plans violate design tolerances or cost constraints [7, 8] , evaluating them against static constraints. In contrast, we are interested in dynamic machine behavior (nominal and off-nominal) induced by plan execution.
Assembly and Metal Machining Example Our factory test-bed -an iCim3000-based Festo Flexible Manufacturing System -consists of conveyor transports, storage, machining and assembly. It serves as the basis for hypothetical example scenarios, where a scheduler schedules the manufacturing of toy mazes (Fig. 1) . A maze consists of an alloy base plate, a small metal ball and an acrylic glass cover fixed by metal pins. It is manufactured by first cutting the labyrinth groove into the maze base-plate, then drilling the fixation holes, putting the ball into the labyrinth, putting the glass cover onto the base plate and finally pushing the pins in place to fixate it. 1 While pushing, the assembly station measures the force to prevent applying too much of it. On its route through the factory the product might get flawed as a result of being worked on by faulty stations. Machining stations are suspicious candidates, because their cutter might break during operation. A broken cutter severely damages maze products (see Fig. 1 ). Since machining stations not only cut grooves but also drill the holes for the pins, broken cutters might also damage these holes. The damage, however, can only be detected later on: If an assembly station tries to push pins into damaged holes, too much force is applied and an alarm is triggered. The same alarm might be triggered if the assembly station's calibration is off, leading to a misalignment of the gripper holding the pin and the base-plate's hole. This means that one cannot infer from the alarm whether the assembly station or the machining station is at fault. The question now is: Is the alarm an indicator for a broken cutter, and how does this possibility affect the different manufacturing plans?
Plan Assessment with Predicted System Behaviors
We address the following plan assessment problem: Given a model M assess and observations o 0:t obtained up to time point t, compute good lower and upper bounds p l and p u on the probability P r(G i | o 0:t ) of a manufacturing plan P i succeeding:
We assume a given schedule S of manufacturing operations, i.e. a sequence of N tuples (p id , c id , t, a) j , where a tuple specifies that component c id performs action a on product p id at time t. It can be seen as a composition of the individual plans P i for each product, which are sequences of actions a. M assess is a probabilistic state space model derived from S, which encodes factory station and product behavior, as well as possible observations. It defines a distribution describing the possible state evolutions for all modeled factory stations and products over time and the influence of observations on this evolution. Variables X t encode possible states at time t, where St t (M assess ) is the set of all possible (atomic) assignment vectors for X t , and St(M assess ) is the set of all assignment vectors over all N time steps, i.e. the set of all possible system trajectories. These trajectories go beyond current time t, thereby predicting system behavior. G i represents the event that a manufacturing plan P i succeeds, i.e. generates a product according to its specification (e.g. a CAD/CAM model or a Bill of Materials (BOM)). Our basic assumption is that P i succeeds as long as no component of the factory fails. Therefore, we model products as Boolean variables G t end i (with True/False for "product ok/flawed"). Success of P i means that G t end i = True at the future finishing time point t end of the product. This simple modeling could be extended to cover multiple intermediate product states by using richer (finite) domains than {True, False}. We define G i as the set of all goal-achieving trajectories
We now define the success probability in terms of goal-achieving system trajectories: Definition 1. Plan Success Probability Given a model M assess , observations o 0:t and a manufacturing plan P i , we define the probability that P i will succeed as
In most cases, it is infeasible to compute P r(G i | o 0:t ) exactly as it requires enumerating all trajectories to generate the complete distribution. Approximations can be computed based on a reduced set of trajectories Θ * ⊂ St(M assess ). In [1] we introduced an approach that enumerates only the k most probable trajectories. Even better is to compute hard bounds p l and p u defined as sum over conditional probabilities P r(θ | o 0:t ) = P r(θ,o0:t) P r(o0:t) of goal-achieving and goal-violating trajectories (entailing G t end i = False) θ ∈ Θ * . Unfortunately, these bounds require to exactly compute P r(o 0:t ), which again requires the complete distribution. Therefore, in this work, we use sampling, which allows us to derive statistical bounds p * u and p * l from confidence intervals that we compute from the samples. Then we can apply a decision procedure we described in [1] , with two modifications: 1) p * l is compared against a threshold ω success and p * u against a threshold ω fail (which we assume as given) and 2) approximation with k most probable trajectories is replaced by sampling.
A Bayesian Logic Network Model of Manufacturing Scenarios
We modeled the behavior of factory machining and assembly stations as well as products as a Bayesian logic network (BLN) [2] B assess (see Fig. 2 ). BLNs combine firstorder logic (FOL) with probabilistic modeling, allowing for compact representations of typical manufacturing interactions as well as uncertain events for classes of manufacturing systems, and they are geared towards practical application of many inference algorithms. A BLN is a template for the construction of a mixed deterministic/probabilistic network [9] , which This means B assess models a class of manufacturing systems, capturing general relations between stations and products, from which models M assess are instantiated for concrete factories and schedules. We then either convert M assess to a standard Bayesian net, so we can apply the large body of Bayesian inference techniques, or do inference in mixed networks directly [10] .
2 BLNs generalize the well-known formalisms of hidden Markov models (HMM) and dynamic Bayesian networks (DBN).
Key elements of a BLN B assess are abstract random variables (ARVs), entity types, fragments and logical formulas. ARVs correspond to logical predicates evaluating to true or false and model states of stations and products as well as relations such as stations working specific products. Placeholders are used within ARVs to refer to abstract typed entities. Fragments are associated with conditional probability tables. Distribu-tions over instantiations of ARVs are defined through multiple fragments (ellipses in Fig. 2 ) with mutually exclusive first-order logic preconditions (boxes in Fig. 2) .
Our model B assess realizes state evolution over time with two abstract entities t0 and t1, representing successive time points, and ARVs relating to them for successive actions, states, etc. A time line is enforced through ARV next(t0, t1), which encodes that t0 precedes t1. When instanciating, successiveness of time points T 0, T 1, . . . is ensured by clamping next(T 0, T 1), next(T 1, T 2), and so on to True. Uncertain station evolution is modeled using two ARVs: assemblyOK(a, t0), assemblyOK(a, t1) and cutterOk(c, t0), cutterOk(c, t1) for assembly and machining stations. The failure probabilities 0.03 and 0.01 for machining and assembly stations are encoded in the fragments for these ARVs. Product state evolution is modeled in a similar way, i.e. we have the ARVs mazeOK(o, t0), mazeOK(o, t1). Their fragments are different in that they currently don't encode any uncertainty. The force alarm observations are encoded as evidence ARVs: pforceHigh(a, t) encodes that the force measured at the assembly station a at time t was too high (if True). To encode actions, B assess consists of relations for assembly and machining stations working mazes at a certain time, i.e. ARVs assemblyActionOn(a, o, t) and cutterActionOn(c, o, t). The complex relation that a force alarm can be triggered by cutter-damaged holes as well as a miscalibrated assembly (section 1) can be expressed as a FOL formula: assemblyActionOn(a, o, t) ⇒ (pforceHigh(a, t) ⇔ (¬assemblyOK(a, t) ∨ ¬mazeOK(o, t))) 3 . To perform plan assessment for a specific scenario, B assess is instantiated to a concrete model M assess . ARVs are thereby compiled to a set of random variables (e.g. mazeOK(Maze0, T0)), fragments to conditional probability distributions over them, and logical formulas to propositional logical constraints. In particular, instances of ARVs representing product states when the product should be finished encode product success, i.e. the goal variables G t end i
. In our scenarios we use goals mazeOK(Maze0, T5), mazeOK(Maze1, T9), mazeOK(Maze2, T7) and mazeOK(Maze3, T12). A given schedule S determines the set E of concrete instances of machining and assembly stations as well as maze products (e.g. Mach0, Maze0, Assy0). Evidence variables (instantiated from evidence ARVs) are clamped to values representing the actual observations, e.g. pforceHigh(Assy0, T4) = True.
Computing Confidence Intervals for Plan Success Probabilities
Now we can use M assess to assess manufacturing plans for individual products. Since we usually cannot have an exact P r(G i | o 0:t ), nor hard bounds (Section 2), we propose to compute the confidence interval of P r(G i | o 0:t ): "soft" bounds p * u and p * l according to a predefined probability γ, the coverage probability, that P r(G i | o 0:t ) will be within these bounds. Proof. Let G be a Bernoulli-distributed Boolean random variable (BBRV) with parameter p, which is being sampled in a Bernoulli-process, counting appearances of is a BBRV with parameter p = P r(G i | o 0:t ). We sample trajectories that correspond to the observations and entail assignments to G t end i
. Therefore, the trajectory sampling can be seen as a sampling of G t end i . The sampling yields n samples, n G t end i goal-achieving and n − n G t end i goal-violating. If we now set G = G
, the theorem follows.
We quickly recap why this works. We abbreviate G t end i to G. The quantities n G , n − n G determine a distribution over p, which (assuming a uniform distribution over parameters when there are no samples) is given by the beta distribution [11] . The CDF F n G ,n−n G (x) = P r(p ≤ x) allows to compute the probability that p is at most x. Observe now that the complement of the given γ = P r(p * l ≤ p ≤ p * u ), i.e. the probability that p is outside the bounds of the interval, can be written as P r(p < p * l ) + P r(p > p * u ) = 1 − γ = α. We can rewrite this equation as P r(p ≤ p * l ) + 1 − P r(p ≤ p * u ) = α, where all probabilities are represented through the CDF F n G ,n−n G (x). Now we can use the inverse CDF F −1 n G ,n−n G (y) to compute the bounds p * l and p * u . Except in extreme cases, we can assume that α is to equal parts composed of P r(p ≤ p * l ) and 1
Of course we would like to have as narrow intervals as possible. Increasing the number of samples gives us narrower intervals. Thus, a practical stop criterion for sampling algorithms is to predefine the size of the interval to be sufficiently small, and then sample until the interval is narrower than this predefined size. Note that an estimate for the success probability itself can be computed in the usual way by dividing the number of goal-achieving samples by the number of all samples, P r(
We inferred the success probability of mazes for three different (hypothetical) scenarios, with corresponding ground models instantiated from B assess , using three sampling algorithms [12, 13, 10] . We ran Java implementations of the algorithms on an Intel Core2 Duo with 2.53 Ghz and 4GB of RAM. In all scenarios there were two machining stations (Mach0/1) and one assembly station (Assy0). In the smaller scenario 1 (310 nodes) Mach0 has become faulty. Its schedule ranges over nine time points for three mazes (Maze0/1/2). Observations have been made up to T4, and a force alarm was triggered at T4 while the assembly station was pushing pins into Maze0. In scenario 2 (520 nodes) Assy0 is faulty. Here, four mazes (Maze0/1/2/3) are scheduled, covering 12 time points. Observations are available up to T8. The pin assembly is done at T4, T6 and T8 for Maze0, Maze2 and Maze1 respectively. A force alarm is observed at all three time points. Scenario 3 (520 nodes) is similar to the former, with the difference that again Mach0 is faulty. Consequently, at T8 no force alarm is triggered. In all scenarios Maze0 and Maze2 are cut on Mach0, while Maze1 and (in scenarios 2 and 3) Maze3 are cut on Mach1. Further, Maze0/1/2/3 should be finished by T5/9/7/12, respectively. Note that results for different products in the same scenario are obtained simultaneously.
In all scenarios we can infer meaningful bounds on the products' success probabilities and thereby identify jeopardized products. table 1 ): While Maze2 is clearly certain to fail, there's an uncertain chance that Maze1 will be ok. So all in all the result could lead to these decisions: In scenario 2, stop all manufacturing and in scenario 3, continue to finish Maze3. In uncertain cases such as scenario 1 methods to actively gather information could be triggered [14] . Table 1 illustrates how choosing stricter coverage probabilities γ widens the interval. It also confirms that increasing the number of samples results in better intervals. Good intervals (γ = 0.95, width less than 0.01) can already be retrieved in under a minute, sometimes even in under a second (scenario 2, SampleSearch), with less than 1000 samples. Choosing a good algorithm seems to depend on the scenarios (see Table  2 ): for 1 and 2 SampleSearch is best, while for 3, likelihood weighting is the better choice. Notably, the runtime does not strictly depend on the problem size, i.e. no single algorithm can be trusted to be equally quick for all problems. A solution could be to run algorithms simultaneously (taking advantage of current multi-core technology) up to a time limit and then take the result with the narrowest interval, or stop when a predefined interval width is reached.
Note that simplified inference methods such as forward filtering (which one might use for HMMs) are not applicable to the type of problem we considered, because the interactions that we modelled result in several coupled temporal chains, which, in particular, do not have the Markov property. Inference is, therefore, considerably more difAlgorithm maxI |I| likelihood weighting backward simulation SampleSearch
